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Abstract
This paper introduces a theoretical model combining household production with an endogenous
risk framework in order to understand how ex-ante private spending by coastal households
would evolve against ex-post cyclone induced storm surge damage risk given the level of
government protective spending and the presence of a mangrove forest. The theoretical model
confirms the influence of public protection programs and the mangrove forest on private defensive
expenditures depending on whether the public programs serve as a possible stochastic substitute
or a stochastic complement to the storm protection provided by the mangroves. We applied the
model to a case study based on survey data from 35 villages comprising 500 households in the
southwest coastal areas of Bangladesh affected by the most recent severe cyclone of November
2007. Empirical results on the full sample reveal that: (i) the presence of public disaster relief and
rehabilitation programs leads to households being willing to invest more in self-insurance but less
in self-protection; (ii) households protected by mangroves are more likely to participate in self-
protection but less in self-insurance; (iii) the income and size of assets have a strong influence on
a household’s choice of self-protection but not on self-insurance; and, (iv) middle income
households are more likely to participate in self-protection and self-insurance compared to low-
income and-rich households; but, once the households decide to participate in private defensive
strategies, resources based on their capabilities to implement the defensive strategies.
Key words: Self-protection; Self-insurance; Cyclone damages; Mangroves; Bangladesh
JEL Classifications: D81, Q51, Q54.
8 SANDEE Working Paper No. 54-10
SANDEE Working Paper No. 54-10 1
Are Private Defensive Expenditures against Storm Damages
Affected by Public Programs and Natural Barriers?
Evidence from the Coastal Areas of Bangladesh
Sakib Mahmud and Edward B. Barbier
1. Introduction
According to reports, climate change may significantly increase the intensity of severe cyclones
and associated storm surge events in future because of sea level rise and increases in sea surface
temperatures (IPCC, 2005, 2007; UNDP, 2007; Dasgupta et al., 2009).  As a result, households
in the coastal areas would be more vulnerable to cyclone and storm surge induced damages to
life and property.  Faced with the possibility of extensive cyclone and storm surge related damages
associated with such a scenario, households that have had previous encounters with damaging
cyclones might invest their time and money in different ex-ante private defensive strategies in
order to insulate themselves against storm surge risk. When households take private action to
reduce the probability and severity of storm-inflicted damages, the storm surge risk becomes
endogenous. Under incomplete markets for insurance, the term for private investments that reduce
the probability of endogenous environmental storm surge risks is “self-protection” while the term
for expenditures that reduce the magnitude of the environmental risk if it is realized is “self-
insurance”.1 However, a household’s access to government-assisted cyclone preparedness and
disaster management programs as well as its access to a natural storm protection barrier such as
a mangrove forest could hinder incentives to increase private storm protection activities to reduce
the storm surge damage risk. Thus, the level of ex-ante private investment that a household might
allocate for protection against storm-inflicted damages might differ from one household to another
depending on risk perception, expectation of public protection programs, and the location of the
household relative to the coast and the mangroves. Taking into account the above factors, this
paper sets out to investigate how ex-ante private spending by coastal households to self-protect
and self-insure against ex-post storm surge damages would evolve given the level of government
protection spending and the presence of a natural storm protection barrier.
Recent reports on climate change also reveal that while the severity of cyclones due to climate
change is increasing on a global scale, coastal areas marked by high population density and
abject poverty might experience more damage as a result of cyclone and storm surge events
(IPCC, 2005, 2007; UNDP, 2007; Dasgupta et al., 2009).2 Conditional upon experiencing
adverse storm events in the future, we can divide a representative household’s preference for ex-
ante private expenditures in this type of unfavorable environment into two parts: (1) Household
ex-ante self protection expenditures on actions that decrease the probability of incurring ex-
post property damages as a result of a future storm event. This includes converting a mud-built
1 Ehrlich and Becker (1972) defined two basic technologies of endogenous risk: self-protection and self-
insurance. Self-protection reduces the probability of an undesired state whereas self-insurance reduces
the severity of consequences if the state is realized. Both self-protection and self-insurance mechanisms
to reduce risks can be extended to natural disaster losses from floods, earthquakes, cyclones, etc.
2 Raw data on natural disaster deaths between 1960 and 2007 prepared by the Center for Research on the
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED, 2008) also reveal that meteorological disaster-related deaths as a result
of cyclones and storm surges are mainly concentrated in the tropics. 91 percent of the deaths occurred in
Asia alone.
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house to a brick-built house, raising the height of the homestead, moving the house inside the
embankment, and taking refuge in a neighbor’s house; (2) Household ex-ante self-insurance
expenditures on actions that relieve the impact of storm surge damage risk to property once it
has occurred.3 This includes opportunities for households to diversify post-disaster income, options
to increase borrowing through different formal and informal sources, and the possibility of receiving
private transfers through remittances and charities (see Table 2).4
However, human behavioral studies show that one of the main inhibiting factors when it comes to
humans investing in natural disaster risk reduction strategies is their inadequate concern for
impending natural disasters (O’Connor et al., 2002; Brechin, 2003; Nisbet and Myers, 2007;
Norgaard, 2009), which leads a future natural disaster risk to remain low on the probability scale
but high on the consequence scale  (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Magat et al., 1987; Camerer
and Kunreuther, 1989;  Kahneman et al., 2001). In addition, access to public-assisted programs
that can either reduce the magnitude of losses to life and property (for e.g., government-funded
cyclone shelters, relief, and rehabilitation programs) or reduce the probability of flooding (for
e.g., government and international donor-funded coastal embankments) in case of a storm event
might induce the coastal households to shirk their own responsibility for risk mitigation which
would be reflected in a reduction in ex-ante self-protection and self-insurance activities. Yet, if
people regard access to government disaster-assistance programs as a premium-free insurance
against natural disasters, it leads to a special kind of moral hazard for the state: that is, while it
may suspect that a household’s decision to refrain from self-protection and self-insurance arises
from the belief that the government cannot infer their motives and/or will bail them out in the event
of a disaster, it cannot, on moral grounds, curtail or deny a household’s right to a public good in
the form of disaster assistance on that basis. This situation of low private response as a result of
expected public-assisted programs might lead to either a partial or full crowding out effect.5
Moreover, government intervention might be lower in areas that are presumed to cope better
because of their close proximity to a possible natural storm protection barrier such as a mangrove
forest. As a result, the crowding out effect in these areas is bound to be lower. Thus, households
living close to a mangrove forest would commit more resources for ex-ante private spending
against storm surge damage if they expect to receive fewer public goods due to lower government
intervention.
Taking into consideration the role played by the degree of government intervention, the moral
hazard and the presence of mangrove forest on ex-ante private investment associated with storm-
surge damages, this paper addresses the following research questions: (1) Does the expectation of
public-assisted disaster relief and rehabilitation programs as a result of the increasing intensity of
future severe cyclone induced storm surge events result in less self-protection and self-insurance by
coastal households?; and (2) Does living in close proximity to mangroves lead to less self-protection
and self-insurance by coastal households against damages from cyclone-induced storm surge events?
To find answers to the research questions, the paper introduces a theoretical model combining
the household production function with an endogenous risk framework where households choose
3 It may seem that the household can take actions prior to as well as subsequent to the occurrence of the
storm surge event. Yet it has to formulate strategies and allocate investment before the event occurrence.
4 Skoufias (2001) has given a detailed exposition of the different coping strategies adopted by households
from low- and middle-income countries to protect themselves against natural disaster risks.
5 ‘Partial’ or ‘full’ crowding effect refers to a household’s decision to partially or fully reduce their investment
in self-protection and self-insurance because they expect increased government spending on disaster
relief and rehabilitation programs against future storm-inflicted damages.
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the level of ex-ante private spending against ex-post cyclone induced storm surge damage risk.6
Estimating the empirical model, the paper focuses on a study of the private defensive expenditure
allocation decisions from 35 villages comprising 500 households in the southwest coastal areas
of Bangladesh which suffered a severe cyclone induced storm surge event in November 2007.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the background to the study and the
relevant literature. Section 3 explains the household model of ex-ante private investment while
Section 4 describes the process of data collection and offers a brief description of the study area.
In Section 5 we discuss the empirical and econometric estimations. Section 6 analyzes the results
while we outline our conclusions and policy recommendations in Section 7.
2. Background
The coastal region of Bangladesh is subject to disastrous cyclones every year due to the unique
geographic and geomorphologic characteristics of the coast making it prone to severe cyclone
and associated storm surge events (IPCC, 2005, 2007; Murty and El-Sabh, 1992; Ali, 1996,
1999; Karim and Mimura, 2008).7  Although according to historical data Bangladesh witnessed
only about 1 percent of the world’s total tropical storms between 1877 and 1995, it experienced
the highest number of storm-inflicted casualties during the same period where 53 percent of the
world’s total tropical storms that claimed 5,000 or more lives took place in Bangladesh (Ali,
1996; GOB, 2008). The high storm-inflicted human casualties are the result of both the high
population density and the poor socio-economic conditions along the Bangladesh coast.
Meteorologists and researchers consider Cyclone Sidr, which made landfall on the south-western
coastal areas of Bangladesh on 15th November 2007 to be the most severe storm event to strike
Bangladesh in recent times.8  It had a diameter of nearly 1000 km and sustained wind speed up
to 240 km per hour accompanied by a maximum tidal surge height of 5.2 meters (or around 17
feet) in some affected areas (GOB, 2008). Although early warning systems contributed to
successful evacuation of the coastal people which resulted in fewer human casualties, there was
extensive damage to houses, live-stock, crops, and trees.9  In addition to the government-assisted
early warning systems installed under the cyclone-preparedness program (CPP), one of the
most significant factors to contribute to reduced loss of life and property was the Sundarban
6 Researchers use the household production function framework extensively in environmental studies to
infer an individual’s values for health risk changes as a result of some environmental ‘bad’ (Berger et al.,
1987; Bresnahan et al., 1997; Harrington & Portney, 1987; Shogren & Crocker, 1992; Freeman, 2003).
7 By severe cyclone and storm surges, the study refers to Category 5 and 6 Cyclones, which are known as
Severe Cyclone with core hurricane intensity (SCHI) and Super Cyclone (SC) respectively. Based on the
Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD) definition, the maximum wind speed is greater than 118
km/h for SCHI whereas it is greater than 220 km/h for SC storms (ADRC, 2005). Under the Saffir-Simpson
hurricane scale, which the National Weather Service in the USA uses to categorize hurricane intensity, the
storms would come under Category 3 and Category 4 if we take into account the expected damages as a
result of cyclone-induced wind speed and storm surge (NWS, 2006).
8 Based on sustained wind speed, Cyclone Sidr is considered to be a category 4 storm under the Saffir-
Simpson Hurricane scale but it is a Category 6 super cyclone under the Bangladesh Meteorological
Department (BMD) cyclone categorization scale.
9 A total of 3406 people perished during Cyclone Sidr with about one thousand declared missing and over
half a million sustaining physical injuries. According to a report by the World Bank and the Government
of Bangladesh (GOB), the Cyclone affected around 2.3 million households to some degree and about one
million very seriously. It estimates total damages and loses at US $1.7 billion (GOB, 2008).
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mangrove forest.10 Studies have estimated that the Cyclone severely affected approximately
30,000 acres of forest resources while it partially affected another 80,000 acres of forest amounting
to total forest damages worth US $145 million due to its impact on the southeastern part of the
Sundarban (GOB, 2008).11  But faced with the prospect of increasingly more severe tropical
cyclones due to climate change, it is of paramount importance to know whether the current
capacity of the forest would provide an effective safeguard to households against future storm-
inflicted damages.12
Available scientific evidence suggests that the ability of mangrove forests to attenuate wave energy
against severe cyclone-induced storm surges strongly depends on forest density, diameter of
stems and roots, forest floor slope, bathymetry, the spectral characteristics (height, period, etc.)
of the incidence of waves, and the tidal stage at which the waves enter the forest (Mazda et al.,
1997, 2006; Massel et al., 1999; Quartel et al., 2007). Basing themselves on types of mangroves
species, Brinkman et al. (1997) and Mazda et al. (2006) have found that waves could be
reduced in energy by 50 percent if a mangrove forest is within 100 to 150 meters. However,
despite scientific literature lending credence to a mangrove’s role as a wave barrier against storm
surges, there is considerable debate on whether they play a significant role in protecting life and
property against the increasing severity of cyclones and associated storm surges.13  Offering a
partial explanation on differences in the actual storm protection role played by mangroves, eco-
hydrology studies have shown that mangroves are less likely to stop a tsunami wave higher than
6 meters, which also implies that they may not be that effective in protecting life and property
against tsunami-type storm surges (Wolanski, 2007; Cochard et al., 2008; Yanagisawa et al.,
2009).  Moreover, according to these same reports, wave attenuation by mangroves is qualitatively
different for large, infrequent disturbances such as tsunamis, hurricanes/typhoons, tidal bores,
etc., as opposed to small, frequent disturbances such as tropical storms, coastal floods, and tidal
waves (Alongi, 2008).
Studies that have considered the inclination of individuals for public or private storm protection
actions reveal that individuals have the tendency to not insure themselves against natural disaster
risks when they believe help will be available from outside sources either via public-sponsored
programs or private charities (Browne and Hoyt, 2000; Kunreuther and Pauly, 2006).  Hence,
public protection programs might partially or fully crowd out private storm protection actions.
This behavioral pattern of under-insurance because of anticipated government support is termed
10 The other significant factor contributing to fewer human casualties is the landfall of Cyclone Sidr during
low tide, which resulted in surge waves of relatively lower height (GOB, 2008).
11 Located along the southwest coast of Bangladesh, the Sundarban mangrove forest is considered to be
the world’s largest mangrove forest spanning 2316 square miles or around 6000 square km (Das and
Siddiqi, 1989; Rahman, 2003).  It is also a world natural heritage site (UNESCO, 2009; WCMC, 2009).
12 This could easily have happened if Cyclone Sidr had had its landfall during high rather than low tide.  In
addition to the threat of exposure to frequent cyclones and storm surges, the forest is also currently
facing other environmental hazards such as salinity due to a rise in sea level and river erosion (Ali, 1996;
Rahman et al., 2008).  Although prohibited by law because the forest is administratively under government
control as a protected area,  studies have estimated that there are about 3.5 million coastal people depending
directly or indirectly on forest resources such as timber, grass, honey/ wax, fish, shrimp fry, etc., for their
livelihood (Hoq, 2007).
13 According to most studies, coastal areas with dense mangrove forests suffered less damage to life and
property compared to areas where mangroves were either completely destroyed or had been converted to
other land uses (Das and Vincent, 2009; Danielson et al., 2005; Kathiresan and Rajendran, 2005; UNEP,
2005; Barbier, 2007).  There is also a handful of studies that question the actual storm protection role
played by mangroves (Alongi, 2008; Chatenoux and Peduzzi, 2007; Kerr and Baird, 2007).
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the ‘charity hazard’ in disaster insurance literature (Browne and Hoyt, 2000; Lewis and Nickerson,
1989; Raschky and Weck-Hannemann, 2007).14  Studies also reveal that an individual’s disregard
for insuring oneself against damages to life and property in the case of natural disaster events
could be the outcome of a tendency to treat natural disaster risks as having a low probability but
high consequences (Magat et al., 1987; Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989; Kunreuther, 1996;
Kahneman et al., 2001).15  Moreover, government intervention might be lower in areas that have
dense mangrove forests because of the storm protection role of mangroves. Thus, it is reasonable
to expect the crowding-out effect in these areas to be lower. This also means that households
living close to a mangrove forest would invest more in ex-ante averting activities against storm-
inflicted damages because they have low expectations of public goods due to lower government
intervention. The following sections of the paper will focus on these issues.
3. The Household Model of Ex-ante Private investment
Let us suppose that a rural household living along the coastal area is exposed to an environmental
risk in the form of a severe cyclone-induced storm surge which would inflict property loss. We
can describe this environmental storm surge risk in terms of two characteristics: (1) the range of
possible adverse consequences, and (2) the probability distribution across consequences. In this
paper, we measure the adverse consequences in units that reflect the consequences to people as
a result of the storm surge event, such as monetary losses in terms of the number of damaged
houses, trees, livestock and poultry, and agricultural crops. To keep the exposition simple, we
assume that there is one possible adverse cyclone-induced storm surge event and two possible
states of nature:
State 1: the storm surge event occurs with the household facing damages to property;
State 2: the storm surge event occurs with the household experiencing no damages to
property.
The household model does not consider states under no storm surge event because under no
storm surge a household maintaining the same status-quo becomes a sure event with the probability
being one while its likelihood of facing any property losses becomes a non-existent event with the
probability being zero. In addition, the model does not bring any dynamic perspective to the
problem assuming that the storm event is more frequent rather than a rare event. Fig. 1 illustrates
the probability tree that depicts how the sequence of events takes place, where experiencing
‘damages to property’ is the final outcome.
Under a simple discrete formulation, Fig. 1 shows that the starting point of the probability tree is
the adverse storm event, where occurrence of the exogenous storm event is assigned probability
θ. Conditional on occurrence of the exogenous storm  event θ, each household faces two states
of nature: the probability of experiencing property damages conditional on the storm event,
π(.) ⏐ θ  (State 1); and the probability of experiencing no damages to property conditional on
the storm event, 1- π(.) ⏐ θ  (State 2). We assume that a household’s ex-ante private spending
14 The charity hazard defines an individual’s tendency not to insure or take any other mitigation measures as
a result of the reliance on expected financial assistance from either federal relief programs or donations by
other individuals.
15  However, Kahn (2005) and Smith et al. (2006) suggest that some private responses are inevitable when a
large share of private and public capital supporting peoples’ livelihoods are at stake irrespective of the
possibility of the crowding out effect
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can influence the probability of experiencing property damage due to a future storm event through
self-protection and a reduction in the severity of the storm-inflicted damages in its aftermath
through self-insurance. For the sake of simplicity, the model does not consider any health-related
impacts such as injury and loss of life as a result of the storm event.
Let us assume that a household chooses to incur ex-ante self-insurance expenditures against a
future storm event if and only if it thinks that prior investment would be beneficial in such a
scenario. Then, each household i located in village j maximizes a utility function with the standard
properties
Uij = Uij (Xij, Sij, ψij) (1)
where X ij is consumption expenditure, Sij is a random variable representing exposure to an
economically damaging storm surge event, and ψij is the exogenous socio-economic characteristics
of the household and its location that may also affect utility.16
Let us represent the probability of facing damages to property conditional on the storm event as
πij (.)⏐θ ≡ πij (Zij, Gij ; Mij , Cij) ⏐θ (2)
where Zij is the level of ex-ante self-protection expenditures to pursue actions to decrease the
probability of facing ex-post property damages conditional on the future storm surge event;17 Gij
is the household’s access to ex-ante public protection programs against the storm event (e.g.,
construction of embankments or dams to reduce the probability of flooding due to cyclone-
induced storm surge);18 Mij  is a vector of characteristics capturing the role of mangroves as a
natural storm protection barrier, such as the area of the nearby mangrove forest, distance between
the mangrove forest and the household, directional location of the household relative to the coast
and the mangroves, etc., and, lastly, Cij is a vector of characteristics of a severe cyclone-induced
storm surge event, where we define the characteristics as storm surge height and wind velocity at
household location, direction and distance of the cyclone path from the household location, etc.
When exposed to a storm event, each household faces monetary losses. We can state this ex-
post damage to property as
Lij = Lij ( Sij ; Aij , Rij ) (3)
where Sij is a random variable representing a household’s exposure to an economically damaging
storm surge event, Aij is the level of ex-ante self-insurance expenditures to pursue actions to
reduce the severity of ex-post property damage as a result of a future cyclone-induced storm
surge event,19 and Rij is the household’s access to ex-post public sponsored disaster relief and
16 Indexing by village j helps to identify villages that are located behind a natural storm protection barrier
such as the mangrove and the ones that are not.  Hence, index j represents a household’s location along
the coast based on two types of possible storm-affected areas: (1) areas that are protected by mangroves
from a future storm event, and (2) areas that are not protected by mangroves from a future storm event, i.e.,
households in villages that are exposed to the coast.
17 The model assumes that there are no interdependencies of self-protection among households.  That is,
private self-protection actions of a household will have no positive or negative externality impact on other
households.  This suggests that there is no way a household can transfer the consequences of its self-
protection actions to others.
18 The word ‘public’ implies national and local governments being in the service of the village j.  We use this
word interchangeably with government throughout the paper.
19 As in the case of self-protection, we assume that there is no interdependence of self-insurance among
households.  That is, if a household adopts self-insurance, then the decision or action has no bearing on
other households in terms of any positive or negative externality.
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rehabilitation programs. We expect the property losses to go up if the household is more exposed
to a cyclone-induced storm surge event. On the other hand, the damage is less if the household
invests in ex-ante self-insurance expenditures and enjoys accessibility to public-assisted programs
designed specifically to reduce the severity of the event.
That is,
Rather than treating Sij as a continuous random event, we assume, for the sake of simplicity,  that
the probability of facing property damages conditional on the storm event can be transformed
into a zero-one event with probability concentrated at Sij = 1 for ‘full exposure’ and Sij  = 0 for
‘no exposure’ conditions. Based on this simplified assumption, Sij  becomes a random event
which is discrete in nature. Hence, the probability of the degree of exposure to damages conditional
on the storm event (State 1) becomes concentrated at Sij = 1 and the probability of facing no
damages conditional on the storm event (State 2) turns out be concentrated at Sij = 0. That is,
Under 'Full Exposure' condition (With Sij = 1), (4)
State 1 (Facing damages to property with the storm event): πij  (Zij, Gij ; Mij , Cij)⏐θ
Under 'No Exposure' condition (With Sij = 0),
State 2 (Zero damages to property with the storm event): πij  (Zij, Gij ; Mij , Cij)⏐θ
where πij  (Zij, Gij ; Mij , Cij) is the probability of the ‘full exposure’ condition of facing damages to
property as a result of the storm surge event.
Substituting the zero-one condition of expression (4) in the ex-post monetary loss or damages to
property expression (3) leads to
Lij = Lij (1; Aij, Rij) = Lij (Aij , Rij), when Sij = 1 (5)
Lij = Lij (0; Aij, Rij) = 0, when Sij = 0
Expression (5) implies that the household faces two situations: (i) property loss which is equivalent
to Lij = Lij ( Aij, Rij) if it is fully exposed to a future cyclone-induced storm surge event (Sij = 1);
(ii) no property loss Lij = 0 if it is not exposed to a future storm surge event (Sij = 0). Thus, based
on the exposure condition, a household faces the prospect of having either monetary losses or no
monetary losses to property as a result of the storm surge event.
The household chooses the level of ex-ante self-protection expenditures Zij and self-insurance
expenditures Aij by maximizing its utility given the following full income constraint
Iij = Xij + Aij + Zij + Lij (Sij ; Aij , Rij) (6)
Considering expressions (1)-(6), substituting the income constraint (6) and re-arranging terms,
the household maximization problem becomes
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where W1 ≡ ((Iij − Aij − Zij − Lij(.)), Sij = 1;ψij) Aij W1 ≡ ((Iij − Aij − Zij − Lij(.)), Sij = 1;ψij ) is the
net wealth considering property loss under full exposure condition (Sij = 1), and W2 ≡ ((Iij − Aij −
Zij ), Sij = 0;ψij) is the net wealth with no property loss under no exposure condition (Sij = 0).
Expression (8) says that the expected utility to be maximized is the sum of utilities of being
exposed and not exposed to a severe cyclone-induced storm surge event weighted by their
respective probabilities. The first-order conditions with respect to the level of ex-ante self-insurance
(Aij) and ex-ante self-protection (Zij)lead to
where U' (W1) and U' (W2) are the marginal utilities of income with respect to self-insurance and
self-protection when Sij = 0 and Sij = 1 respectively.
Expression (8) reveals that a household could employ ex-ante private spending to reduce the
severity of storm surge damages up to the point where the expected marginal benefits of self-
insurance as defined by the net reduction in loss is equal to the expected marginal costs of self-
insurance. Expression (9) reveals that a household could employ ex-ante private spending to
protect itself against a storm surge up to the point where the expected marginal benefits of self-
protection as defined by the decreased chance of the bad state weighted by the utility difference
between the states just about balance the expected marginal costs of self-protection.
3.1 Comparative Analysis under Self-protection and Self-insurance
It might be possible that a household’s choice of self-protection and self-insurance to reduce
extensive storm-inflicted damages is influenced by its access to government protection programs
as well as its access to mangroves. Irrespective of income and asset holdings, a household faced
with the prospect of public programs and living in close proximity to mangroves is likely to invest
less in self-protection and self-insurance. We explore now the influence of these postulates over
a household’s self-protection and self-insurance.
Given the model assumptions along with additional restrictions, results from the comparative
statics reveal the following propositions. We provide proofs of the following propositions in
Appendix 1.
PROPOSITION 1: For a risk-averse household, ex-ante government protection spending Gij
is a complement to ex-ante self-protection                           but a substitute to ex-ante self-insurance
PROPOSITION 2: For a risk-neutral household, ex-ante self-protection Zij goes down (i.e.,
becomes a substitute) but ex-ante self-insurance Aij goes up (i.e., becomes a complement) if
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households have more access to ex-post public-assisted disaster relief and rehabilitation programs
                    However, for a risk-averse household, it is not possible to determine the
direction of the influence of ex-post public disaster relief and rehabilitation programs on ex-ante
self-protection and self-insurance.
PROPOSITION 3: For a risk-averse household, we expect exposure to the storm protection
services of mangrove forests Mij to increase the household’s ex-ante self-protection Zij , i.e., ,
  but to decrease ex-ante self- insurance
That is, exposure to storm protection services by mangroves acts as a complement to self-
protection but as a substitute to self-insurance. Table 1 summarizes the comparative statics results
with the accompanying conditions.
In terms of policy implications, for a risk-averse household, Proposition 1 shows the possibility
of ‘full’ or ‘partial’ crowding in for self-protection but crowding out for self-insurance in the case
of an increase in ex-ante government spending. On the other hand, assuming a household to be
risk-neutral, Proposition 2 reveals the possibility of observing the ‘full’ or ‘partial’ crowding out
effect on households’ self-protection but a ‘full’ or ‘partial’ crowding in effect on their self-
insurance activities in case of an increase in ex-post public-assisted disaster relief and rehabilitation
programs. Lastly, Proposition 3 suggests that households which live in close proximity to
mangroves and are risk averse are more likely to invest in self-protection but less in self-insurance.
3.2 Ex-ante Willingness to Pay
Given certain restrictions, we find that the directional results from Proposition 1-3 provide the
necessary tool to derive the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for a household as a result of its
increased access to public protection programs and mangroves in order to reduce storm-inflicted
damage risks.
In our household model for ex-ante private investment, two of the key assumptions are: (1) self-
protection, Zij, can only influence the probability of facing property damages, πij, and (2)  self-
insurance, Aij, can only influence the ex-post monetary loss to property, Lij. That is, both self-
protection and self-insurance separately affect the two final outcomes when a household is exposed
to a future severe cyclone induced storm surge event. Assuming the sufficient conditions (a) and
(b) listed in Corollary 1 of Shogren and Crocker (1991), the ex-ante willingness to pay expressions
under this model show that it is possible to remove the utility terms irrespective of state
independence or state dependence.20  Consequently, the model does not suffer from any ‘joint
production technology’ problem (Dickie, 2003; Freeman, 2003). In fact, Freeman (2003)
suggested that the averting behavior model cannot be applied due to the jointness of the implicit
production technology which arises if the averting activities jointly produce reductions in the
probability of a bad state and the magnitude of the bad event once it is realized.
20 Condition (a) and (b) of Corollary 1 of Shogren and Crocker (1991) states that, “utility terms will not
appear in ex-ante willingness to pay expressions for endogenous risk changes if and only if at least one
of the following conditions is true: (a) A two-state world exists where ex-ante self-protection affects
only ex-ante probability; (b) A two-state world exists where ex-ante self-protection affects only ex-post
severity, and the marginal utilities between states are equal” (1991, p.8).
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Given the assumptions, the value to the household of an increase in ex-ante public protective
spending (Gij) to reduce the probability of facing damages to property is the marginal change in
income that holds the expected utility constant. We could find this by first totally differentiating
Equation (7) and setting it equal to zero and then by applying the first order conditions using
expressions (8)-(9) and letting dRij = dCij = 0 but dMij  ≠ 0.
Expression (10) shows that a household’s marginal willingness to pay for a small increase in ex-
ante government protective measures depends on two parts. The first part represents the direct
effect of ex-ante government programs on self-protection based on the ratio of the marginal
productivities of self-protection Zij  and ex-ante public spending Gij  in reducing the probability of
storm surge damages to property πij (.). The second part is the indirect effect on self-protection
represented by the multiplication of two terms: (1) the ratio of marginal productivities of self-
protection Zij  and the storm protection role of mangroves Mij  in reducing the probability of storm
surge damages to propertyπij (.); and (2) the influence of ex-ante public spending Gij on the
storm surge protection role of mangroves Mij.
Similarly, MWTP for an increase in the storm protection role of mangroves Mij holding the
expected utility constant also depends on the relationship among self-protection, government
spending, and the storm protection role of mangroves. Totally differentiating equation (7) and
setting it equal to zero, substituting the first order conditions under expressions (8)-(9), and
allowing  dGij ≠ 0 but dRij = dCij = 0 leads to
Again expression (11) shows that the marginal willingness to pay for an increase in the storm
protection role of mangroves Mij depends on two parts. The first part is the direct effect of
mangroves on self-protection represented by the marginal rate of technical substitution between
the storm protection role of mangroves Mij and self-protection Zij in reducing the probability of
experiencing storm-inflicted damages to property πij( .). In addition, the MWTP depends also
on the indirect effect of mangroves on self-protection comprising the multiplication of two terms:
(1) the rate of technical substitution between ex-ante public spending Gij and self-protection Zij
in reducing the probability of storm-inflicted damages πij; and, (2) the term representing the
influence of the storm protection role of mangroves Mij on ex-ante public spending Gij.
SANDEE Working Paper No. 54-10 11
We can find the value of an increase in household access to ex-post government storm-risk-
reducing strategies like relief and rehabilitation programs Rij by totally differentiating equation (7),
setting it equal to zero, substituting the first order condition from expression (8), and letting
dGij = dMij = 0
Expression (12) reveals that a household’s marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for a small
increase in ex-post government risk-reducing programs like disaster relief and rehabilitation
programs is the ratio of the marginal productivities of ex-ante self-insurance Aij and a household’s
access to government relief and rehabilitation programs Rij in reducing monetary loss to property
Lij. This is the same as the marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS) between Aij and Rij in
reducing Lij.
4. Study Area, Sampling and the Data
4.1 Study Area
The study analyzes ex-ante private spending for purposes of self-protection and self-insurance
by the coastal households of Bangladesh in order to protect themselves against ex-post storm
damages given the level of government protection programs and the presence of a natural storm
protection barrier, the Sundarban mangrove forest.21 Given their differential access to public
protection programs, the study gave us an ideal opportunity to find differences in private defensive
strategies adopted by households from the affected areas. We have divided the study area into
two taking into consideration the research questions:22
(1) Areas that are located behind the Sundarban mangrove forest and in a clock-wise direction
from Cyclone Sidr;
(2) Areas that are not located behind the Sundarban mangrove forest and are placed either in
a clock-wise or counter-clockwise direction from Cyclone Sidr.
In the case of the latter, there is no natural storm protection barrier to rely upon. Therefore, they
have to rely on other forms of protection through either public or private actions. We adopted the
following procedure in order to demarcate the study area:
21 This case study is well suited to answer the research questions in several respects. Firstly, we conducted
the household survey within a year from the most recent economically damaging severe cyclone induced
storm surge event experienced by the coastal households. This allowed us to get information on key
variables from the affected households based on both records and recollections of the event.  Secondly,
the storm surge event had not only affected households that were exposed to the coast, that is, those
without a natural storm protection barrier, but also households that were located behind the Sundarban
mangrove forest, which is a natural storm protection barrier. Given their differential access to public
protection programs, this gave us an ideal opportunity to study the differences in private defensive
strategies adopted by households from the two affected areas.
22 Research questions are: (1) Does the expectation of public-assisted disaster relief and rehabilitation
programs as a result of the increasing intensity of future severe cyclone induced storm surge events
result in less self-protection and self-insurance by coastal households?; and, (2) Does living in close
proximity to mangroves lead to less self-protection and self-insurance by coastal households against
damages from cyclone-induced storm surge events?
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Step 1: We first selected the areas located on the southwest coast of Bangladesh for the case
study because they fall under the high cyclone risk zone (see Figure 2);23
Step 2: Applying GIS, we followed the track of the Cyclone Sidr and the position of the Sundarban
mangrove forest in order to identify the areas that would be suitable for the analysis (see
Figure 3 and Figure 4);
Step 3: Using GIS, we identified both the protected (P) and the non-protected (NP) coastal
areas (see Figure 4).24  We define as protected coastal areas (P) any area that is located
behind the Sundarban mangrove forest and is located in a clockwise direction from Cyclone
Sidr.  Conversely, we define non-protected areas (NP) as any area that is not located
behind the Sundarban mangrove forest and is in either a clockwise or counter-clockwise
direction from Cyclone Sidr;
Step 4: We then applied ‘random area sampling’ to select the unions that fall under protected (P)
and non-protected (NP) areas.25 While selecting the unions, we maintained an equal distance
to the right and left from the track of Cyclone Sidr.
4.2 Sampling Strategy
Taking into consideration the fact that Bangladesh is most vulnerable to severe cyclone and
storm surge events during the pre-monsoon (April-June) and post-monsoon (October-November)
seasons, we conducted the household survey during the post-monsoon season. We selected
around 500 households from 35 villages in 18 unions using a stratified random sampling method.
Out of the 18 unions, 8 unions fall under the protected areas while the rest fall under the non-
protected areas. We selected the households randomly from each union based on a percentage-
wise rural-urban composition and the type of dwellings using the Bangladesh Population Census
Data.
We conducted personal interviews with the head of the household using trained enumerators
speaking the local language under the supervision of the researcher. We pre-tested the
questionnaires in October 2008. We carried out the final survey from the 1st to the 15th of
November, 2008. The survey gathered information on household involvement in ex-ante private
averting activities along with expenditures against ex-post Cyclone Sidr-inflicted damages. It
also collected information on important demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the
households.  We collected secondary data, especially meteorological information on Cyclone
Sidr and geophysical information on the Sundarban mangrove forest, from various sources.26
23 We selected the area based on the Saffir-Simpson tropical storm intensity scale developed by the UN
Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (OCHA).  Like the areas on the southwest coast, the entire
Sundarban Mangrove forest area also comes under the high risk zone.  We do not provide in this study
the map illustrating the location of the mangrove forest vis--vis the high cyclone risk zone but it is
available from the authors upon request.
24 GIS stands for Geographic Information Systems.
25 The term ‘union’ refers to the lowest administrative unit in the rural areas of Bangladesh.  Administratively,
Bangladesh has 6 divisions, 64 zilas, 508 upazilas and 4466 unions (Source: Statistical Pocketbook of
Bangladesh, 2009).  Under the Village Chaukidari Act of 1870, villages were grouped into unions to
provide for a system of watches and wards in each village.
26 We summarize both primary and secondary sources of data in Table 2.A under Appendix 1.
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4.3 Household Characteristics in the Study Area
Table 2 reveals the general demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the 500 households
in the two case study areas, where 220 households fall under the protected area (P) and the rest
fall under the non-protected area. For the protected areas, the percentage of male respondents
is 84.1 percent whereas, for non-protected areas, it is 71.8 percent. The average age of the
respondents is around 42-43 years. 52.1 percent of the respondents had completed primary
school (class 1-5) level education in the protected areas while it was 45.5 percent in the non-
protected areas. Less than 30 percent had completed high school in both areas. The average
household size is five in the protected areas and six in the non-protected areas. Both household
sizes in the sample cohere therefore with the national household average of Bangladesh. Results
show that most of the respondents (more than 90 percent) have been living in the same village
since birth.
Regarding occupation, most of the household members earn their livelihood from day labor (36
percent) in the protected areas and from agriculture (40 percent) in non-protected areas.27 Business
activities come second in both the case study areas representing 13-16 percent of the respondents.
In both study areas, most of the households own the houses they live in. Regarding the structure
of the house, most house walls are made of wood while the roofs are made of tin or corrugated
iron sheets. More than 20 percent of the houses in non-protected areas are two storied whereas,
in the protected areas, less than 10 percent of the total houses are two storied. Interestingly, less
than 50 percent of the households in both study areas made any changes to their dwellings to
reduce exposure to storm surge inflicted damages although more than 50 percent believe that
their houses face some storm surge inflicted damage risk due to their location at low elevations.
In the study area, less than one third of the households have access to electricity while access to
a cell phone is close to 50 percent in both areas. Sources of drinking water vary between the two
study areas. In the protected area, households mainly drink from ponds/canals, rivers, and
preserved rain water. In the non-protected areas, on the other hand, households rely on tube-
wells, ponds/canals, rivers, and deep tube-wells.
The average annual household income showed similarities in the two study areas despite differences
in the respondents’ main occupations. The average annual household income in the protected
area was US $816 while it was approximately US $858 in the non-protected area. However,
the average market value of assets (excluding house, land and pond) turned out to be higher for
households in the non-protected area at approximately US $4609 compared to households in
the protected area for which it was around US $2802. The average annual per capita income is
about US $187 in the study areas, which is substantially lower in comparison with the national
average of US $599 for the same period.28
With respect to the degree of exposure to Cyclone Sidr, we found that the majority of the
households which faced Cyclone Sidr-inflicted damages in the two case study areas have yearly
income below Tk. 100,000 (or less than US $1450).  We also found low-income households in
both areas to spend a significant portion on ex-ante averting activities as opposed to high-income
households.  This might indicate the influence of socio-economic variables on household choice
of ex-ante private actions.  In terms of Cyclone Sidr-inflicted total damages, we found damages
to households in the non-protected area (at around Tk. 10,000 or US $145) to be higher than
for those households located in the protected area.  Table 3 shows the mean comparison results
for the two groups based on past and current yearly income, total damages, and ex-ante averting
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expenditures for self-protection and self-insurance. Interestingly, the results reveal that households
located in the protected area have spent more on ex-ante self-protection but less on self-insurance
compared to households in the non-protected area. But total damages as a result of Cyclone
Sidr are high in the non-protected area. These outcomes might imply that households in the non-
protected area allocate more for ex-ante self-insurance since their expectation of facing future
cyclone-inflicted damages are higher than for those households in the protected area.
On the issue of accessibility to public protection programs, we found 82 percent of the households
in the non-protected area to live inside the embankment while only 35 percent of the households
from the protected area live inside the embankment. Similarly, 62 percent of households in the
non-protected area live close to a cyclone shelter.  This accessibility is at 44 percent in the case
of households in the protected area.  Thus, households from the non-protected area have more
access to public programs compared to households from the protected area.  We have summarized
the results in Table 4.
5. Empirical Analysis and Econometric Specification
This section discusses how we have used the theoretical model to answer the research questions.
In order to position the empirical study vis--vis the research questions, we present the research
hypotheses below:
H1: Expected storm-inflicted damage is an important determinant of households investing in
ex-ante private defensive strategies in terms of self-protection and self-insurance activities;
H2: The presence of public disaster relief and rehabilitation programs leads to households
investing less in self-protection and self-insurance activities against expected storm-inflicted
damages;
H3: Households living in close proximity to mangroves invest less in self-protection and self-
insurance activities against expected storm-inflicted damages.
In order to test hypothesis H1 using empirical data, the paper first estimates whether households
that place a higher value on ex-ante private defensive strategies by participating in self-protection
and self-insurance are also the ones that are more likely to be exposed to storm-inflicted damages.
That is, whether the expectation of facing future storm-inflicted damages would encourage
households to employ more private defensive strategies ex-ante. To test hypotheses H2 and H3,
the paper then estimates how the value that a household places on ex-ante private averting
behavior (i.e., self-protection and self-insurance) changes as a result of an increase in access to
ex-ante public protective spending                     ; an increase in exposure to mangrove forests ;
                        and an increase in access to ex-post government-sponsored relief and rehabilitation
programs                  These econometric estimations are not only able to test the research
hypotheses but to empirically examine Propositions 1-3.
In addition, the paper also attempts to test the marginal willingness to pay (WTP) propositions
(10)-(12) indirectly since direct measurement of the WTPs are not feasible. Expressions (10)-
(12) reveal that to empirically estimate the MWTPs, it is imperative to find: (1) marginal effects of
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Gij and  Mij on ex-ante self-protection  Zij ; (2) marginal effect of  Rij on ex-ante self-insurance
Aij ; and, (3) possible sign and direction of the relationship between  Gij and  Mij. Using the
theoretical model, it is possible to derive reduced-form demand equations for ex-ante averting
strategies of self-protection  Zij and self-insurance  Aij in order to discover the marginal effects
among the key variables.  In addition, it is possible to test the reduced form equations empirically
in order to test the possible comparative statics results (see Table 1). Based on the first order
conditions under expressions (8) and (9), we can translate the household’s optimal choices into
a binary decision (0,1) of whether to undertake any ex-ante averting strategies against a storm-
inflicted damage risk in the future.29
Let us assume that  dZij  is an indicator of the binary decision to participate in ex-ante self-
protection  Zij and d
A
ij is the other indicator of the binary decision to participate in ex-ante self-
insurance Aij. Furthermore, let us assume that each household is rational and makes an optimal
investment decision based on marginal analysis. Then, following equations (8) and (9), a household’s
choice is determined by
The above expression implies that households will only participate in ex-ante averting strategies
if the expected marginal benefits of undertaking private defensive strategies (i.e.,  Zij and  Aij) are
no less than the expected marginal costs of undertaking the strategies. Otherwise, it will not
participate in any ex-ante averting strategies. We can specify expression (13) also as the probability
models that are convenient for empirical estimations.
Based on these simplified assumptions, the participation decision of a household will differ with
its access to ex-ante government protective programs Gij , exposure to mangrove forest  Mij ,
access to ex-post public sponsored relief and rehabilitation programs  Rij , as well as its socio-
economic characteristics, ψij. Because characteristics of a severe cyclone-induced storm surge
event can affect the effectiveness of a household’s ex-ante averting choices, storm characteristics
Cij will also then influence the decision to participate.
From the utility maximizing problem in expression (7), if the household does decide to undertake
ex-ante averting strategies, then we can specify the linear representations of the reduced form
equations for optimal self-protection G*ij and optimal self-insurance A*ij as
29 It is possible to find a similar binary response assumption to investigate household optimal choices in
applied empirical studies by Agee and Crocker (1996) and Barbier (2007).
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In expressions (13)-(14), we show the exact econometric specifications for self-protection and
self-insurance in Appendix 3 based on the two ‘hurdles’ (i.e., hurdles based on participation and
outcome choices).30
Since not all households in the sample participate in self-protection or self-insurance activities,
the main data issue arises when ex-ante averting expenditures are missing for households who do
not participate in any ex-ante averting activities.31  If the first order conditions are not satisfied, it
is natural to expect households to be less willing to participate in any ex-ante averting activities,
i.e., self-protection or self-insurance, or both. Hence, there will be sample selection bias if we
apply the OLS regression analysis because it may not be possible to make inferences about the
determinants of the ex-ante level of private spending for the entire coastal population. To avoid
this sample selection bias and taking into account the household responses to self-protection and
self-insurance measures, we take the recorded ‘zero self-protection’ or ‘self-insurance
expenditures’ from the household survey as a discrete choice which does not arise either from
infrequency of investment or a corner solution.32  Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the first
hurdle dominance applies for this study. Consequently, if the model assumes dependence between
the disturbance terms in the participation and the outcome equations, then we can apply either
full information maximum likelihood (FIML) or the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML)
using the Heckman two-step method (Heckman, 1979). On the other hand, if the model does
not assume any dependency between the error terms, then we could suggest a two-part model
(Cragg, 1971; Manning et al., 1981; Jones, 1989; Leung and Yu, 1996; Puhani, 2000; Madden,
2008).33  However, considering the collinearity issue associated with the inverse mills ratio and
other regressors under the Heckman two-step method, the paper reports estimation results both
from the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimator and the two-part model.  Hence,
we can use the results for comparison purposes.
6.   Results and Discussion
For the preliminary analysis, we base the regression results reported in this paper on the full
sample of the household survey. Table 5 shows the summary statistics based on the means and
standard deviations of the explanatory variables that are used for the regression analyses. Table
6 presents the result of the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) of the full sample selection
model for self-protection. It has two parts: (1) results from the selection equation with the marginal
30 For simplicity, we assume the demand functions for ex-ante averting strategies to be linear.
31 As Table 4 indicates, only 107 households incurred self-protection expenditures whereas 297 households
incurred self-insurance expenditures.
32 In the household survey questionnaire, the relevant questions regarding self-protection and self-insurance
were as follows.
(1) For participation in self-protection, the question was, “have you taken any private self-protection measures
to avoid or avert damages (losses) to property before occurrence of a severe cyclone event?” For those
who answered ‘yes’ to this question, the follow-up question (for outcome) was, “what are the types of
private self-protection measures you or your household have taken? What is the approximate amount
spent to pursue each self-protection measure to reduce cyclone-induced storm surge damages?”
(2) For participation in self-insurance, the question was, “did your household take any private self-insurance
measures to reduce the damage (loss) to property after occurrence of a severe cyclone?” Those who
answered ‘yes,’ were then asked about the type of self-insurance measures taken to reduce the severity
of severe cyclone-inflicted property damages.
33 Both Leung and Yu (1996) and Puhani (2000) suggested that the two part-model is likely to outperform the
Heckman model (1976, 1979) when there exists high collinearity between the Inverse Mills ratio term and
the explanatory variables.
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effects of the regressors on the probability of participation in self-protection; and, (2) results
from the outcome equation conditional on participation with the marginal effects of the regressors
on the expected value of the level of self-protection expenditures. Table 6 reports four regression
specifications starting with the parsimonious model comprising Cyclone Sidr inflicted damages,
Pre-Cyclone Sidr income, and distance from the coast. To get reasonably stable estimates under
the exclusion restrictions, the parsimonious specification of the selection equation also considers
additional variables like whether the household is located inside the embankment and asset holdings
based on ownership of homestead, cropland, and pond area. For the next regression specification,
we progressively add additional controls starting with the socio-economic and the storm protection
role of mangroves characteristics. The addition of public programs follows this specification.
The last regression specification includes the characteristics of Cyclone Sidr—the most recent
severe cyclone event of November 2007 which affected the southwest coastal areas of Bangladesh
including the Sundarban mangrove forest.
Under FIML, regression results from the selection equation support the hypotheses that storm-
inflicted damage is an important determinant of households’ participation in ex-ante self-protection.
This variable is positive and highly significant in all regression specifications. Furthermore, the log
and square log of a household’s pre-Cyclone Sidr income remains significant with positive and
negative signs respectively under all specifications. This might suggest that the probability of a
household participating in ex-ante self-protection activities has an inverse U-shaped relationship
with income, initially increasing, but then declining. Hence, it is more likely that a middle-income
household will pursue self-protection compared to a low- and high-income household. This
could happen if the middle-income households perceive existing public disaster relief and
rehabilitation programs to give preference to low-income households on the basis that they are
the most vulnerable as well as without the means (unlike rich households) to reduce the likelihood
of being affected by future storm-inflicted damages. Conversely, the coefficient of ownership of
homestead, cropland, and pond area—a form of assets holding—remains positive and significant
throughout. This might indicate that the richer households rely on their asset holdings rather than
on income when making choices regarding self-protection.
Among the socio-economic characteristics, results show that a household is more likely to
participate in self-protection if it has a fewer number of children, has memberships in different
village level organizations indicative of a social network, and has less access to credit compared
to other households. With regard to the role of mangroves, households that fall into the protected
area are more likely to participate in self-protection though this turns out to be insignificant when
other controls like public programs and storm characteristics are progressively added to the
model. However, directional location of the household relative to the coast and the mangroves
plays a key role in household participation in self-protection. Under the most elaborate regression
specification that introduces all the controls, results show that the households located to the
north, northeast and northwest directions relative to the coast and the Sundarban mangrove
forest are more likely to participate in self-protection compared to other households. Distance
between the mangrove forest and the union where the household’s village is located bears the
negative sign but is insignificant under all specifications. Among the public programs, public disaster
relief leads to households participating less in self-protection activities. But the presence of public
disaster rehabilitation leads to more participation in self-protection though it is significant only at
the 10% level. When it comes to storm surge characteristics, surge height and the directional
distance between the household and the track of the Cyclone Sidr both have positive influences
on households participating in self-protection.
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The results of the outcome equation conditional on participation also confirm the hypothesis that
storm-inflicted damage is an important determinant of a household’s choice of the level investment
in self-protection. The coefficient remained significant and changed little in magnitude as we
added other controls progressively such as regressors capturing the socio-economic characteristics
of the household and the storm protection role of mangroves, access to public disaster relief and
rehabilitation programs, and the characteristics of the severe cyclone-induced storm surge.
Interestingly, the log and square log of pre-Cyclone Sidr income remain strongly significant in all
regression specifications bearing negative and positive signs respectively. That is, conditional on
participation, a household’s level of self-protection expenditures exhibit a U-shaped relationship
with income, initially declining, but then increasing. This might imply that once a household decides
to participate, low- and high-income households allocate more for self-protection compared to
middle-income households. This might imply that a low-income household, because of its low
income, smaller asset holdings, and lack of access to public programs, is forced to allocate more
for self-protection to reduce the probability of being affected by storm-inflicted damages.
Otherwise, it might be impossible for the low-income household to reduce the severity of the
damages once the storm event has taken place. However, for a richer household conditional on
its decision to participate in self-protection, allocating a significant portion for self-protection
might be associated more with affordability rather than with the ability to reduce the severity of
storm-inflicted damages once the storm event has occurred. Among the socio-economic variables,
results show that a household invests more in self-protection if it does not plan to migrate in the
future and has access to credit but is not a member of any village-level organization. Regarding
the role of mangroves and public programs, none of the variables seems to have a strong influence
on household level of self-protection spending.34  This same outcome also applies when we
consider the role of the storm surge characteristics on self-protection investment.
Under FIML, the likelihood ratio test (LR test) for correlation between the error terms of the
two equations (P = 0) for all specifications suggests little evidence against the null since the value
of the LR statistics are small with p-values greater than 10%. That is, we fail to reject the null or
the independence between the error terms in all cases. Thus, the LR test supports the application
of the two-part model instead of the Heckman two-step method using the limited information
maximum likelihood estimation (LIML). Moreover, considering the issue of collinearity associated
with the inverse mills ratio and other regressors, the paper reports results from the two-part
model which we can use as an alternative regression specification against the results derived from
FIML. Table 7 reports the two-part model for ex-ante self-protection in the selection equation
(using the Probit estimation) followed by the estimation on the outcome equation (using the OLS
estimation on the sub-sample of positive observations under the selection equation). The Probit
estimation on the participation equation reveals similar results to the FIML estimation regarding
the test of hypotheses. That is, the probability of participation in self-protection is highly influenced
by the future storm-inflicted damages. Like the results from FIML, a household’s income and
asset holdings in terms of land ownership strongly influence the probability of participation.
However, results also show that households located outside the embankment are more likely to
participate in self-protection. Among the socio-economic characteristics, households that have
less access to credit and have fewer children are more likely to participate in self-protection.
Regarding the role of mangroves, again the directional location of the household relative to the
coast and the mangroves play an influential role on a household’s choice for self-protection.
34 Under FIML, all the characteristics capturing the storm protection role of mangroves cannot be added to
the outcome specification since inclusion of the dummy variables representing the directional location of
the household relative to the coast and the mangroves lead to ‘no convergence.’
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Among the public programs, the probability of participation in self-protection is high among
households who have less access to public disaster relief programs. But it is low with regard to a
household’s access to rehabilitation programs although the coefficient becomes insignificant when
we add storm characteristics to the model. Among the storm characteristics variables, height of
the storm surge and the directional location of the household vis--vis the track of the cyclone
can influence a household’s participation in self-protection activities.
Estimation results from the second part of the model (OLS estimation on the sub-sample of
positive observations) support the hypothesis that storm-inflicted damages play a key role on the
household-level self-protection spending. Household income seems to have a strong influence
on self-protection. Signs of the coefficients on the log and square log of income again support the
presence of a U-shape relationship with self-protection expenditures implying that the low-and
high-income households allocate more for self-protection compared to the middle-income
households although not all coefficients are significant. The presence of public disaster-relief
programs is significant and bears the same negative sign although the coefficient for public disaster-
rehabilitation programs is not significant. However, the role of mangroves as a storm-protection
service has no influence on the self-protection spending.35 Among the socio-economic variables,
the level of self-protection is less if the household is planning to relocate in the future to a better
location.
Tables 8 and 9 show the estimation results for self-insurance. Due to data limitations on determining
the level of self-insurance expenditures, we cannot estimate both the FIML estimator and the
two-part model. However, it is possible to partially determine the amount of self-insurance
expenditures by the household if we take into account the medical expenditures associated with
the Cyclone Sidr-inflicted health damages and the approximate nominal value of the remittances
received to deal with storm damages. We assume that both medical expenditures and the remittance
received to deal with storm damages can be used as proxies for self-insurance, as both the
actions are costly for the household in terms of transferring funds from good to bad states of
nature.36  Both the actions are costly in the sense that they become sunk costs in dealing with the
severity of storm-surge-inflicted damages where the opportunity costs of using the funds for
alternative purposes could be significant especially for the poorer households. Nevertheless, the
simplified assumption in determining ex-ante self-insurance expenditures comes with a caveat:
the possibility of having no way to identify the linkage between the household participation decision
and, conditional on participation, a household’s choice regarding the level of self-insurance. Hence,
we perform a separate Probit estimation on the probability of a household pursuing self-insurance
actions and a separate Tobit estimation to deal with the censored nature of the sum of the self-
insurance proxy variables (i.e., medical expenditures and remittances).37  In addition, we included
35 To compare the results with FIML, we drop dummy variables 1-7 representing the directional location of the
household relative to the coast and the mangrove forest from the outcome equation of the two part model.
36 During disasters or emergencies, remittances can be a vital source of income for people whose other forms
of livelihood may have been destroyed either by conflict or due to natural disaster. According to the
Overseas Development Institute, aid actors who are considering better ways of supporting people in
emergency responses increasingly recognize this as important (Savage, 2007).   However, there is an
opportunity cost regarding the use of remittances in dealing with disasters as they could have been
allocated for more productive other alternatives.
37 Given the assumptions, the Tobit estimation on the level of self-insurance allows censoring to be placed
at zero without any loss of generality since there is no negative self-insurance value.  Also, we assume
that households not responding to the amount allocated for self-insurance have zero self-insurance
expenditures.  Therefore, we can infer these simplified assumptions as a way to deal with the missing values.
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a household’s income before the Cyclone Sidr event and a household’s income after the Cyclone
Sidr event. By defining the former as pre-Cyclone Sidr income or pre-income and the latter as
post-Cyclone Sidr income or post-income, we try to capture their influence on the household
level of self-insurance since a household’s income can vary significantly between what it was
before the cyclone and after if the household has the option to diversify its post-disaster income
which might be different from its pre-disaster income source.38  For instance, while a household’s
pre-cyclone income (i.e., pre-income) might have come from subsistence agriculture, its post-
cyclone income (i.e., post-income) might come from day labor because the agriculture crops
have been destroyed as a result of the Cyclone.
Similar to self-protection, regression results of the Probit estimation in Table 8 reveal that self-
insurance is also an important private defensive strategy against storm-inflicted damages.
However, the coefficients of both public disaster relief and rehabilitation programs are positive
and highly significant. This implies that the probability of a household participating in self-insurance
increases if the household has more access to public disaster relief and rehabilitation programs,
which is contrary to the results found under self-protection. Among the mangrove variables, the
coefficient of the binary variable representing whether a household comes within the mangrove-
protected area has a negative sign and is statistically significant. This implies that households from
the protected area are less likely to invest in self-insurance. But the variable is dropped under the
final regression specification when we add the storm surge characteristics controls progressively
to the model. In addition, households that are located to the southeast, east, and northeast direction
relative to the coast and the mangroves are more likely to participate in self-insurance.
Among the socio-economic controls, a household is more likely to participate in self-insurance if
it has access to credit and has more children whereas it is less likely to participate if it is a member
of a village-level organization which ensures access to some form of social capital. Interestingly,
households are also more likely to participate in self-insurance if it is located at a higher elevation.
However, although the log and square log of pre-disaster income indicate the existence of an
inverted U-shaped relationship, they do not have a significant influence on the probability of self-
insurance. In addition, the log and square log of post-disaster income show no significant relationship
to the likelihood of a household participating in self-insurance. This might imply that other factors
rather than income play a major role on household level self-protection participation.
Table 9 shows the censored Tobit model results for estimating the level of ex-ante self-insurance
expenditures of the households. The results confirm that storm-inflicted damage is an important
factor in household level self-insurance investment. Under all specifications, the coefficient of the
nominal value of storm-inflicted property damages remains positive and highly significant. When
it comes to income, the coefficients of the log and square log of post-Cyclone Sidr income (i.e.,
household income after Cyclone Sidr) are highly significant with negative and positive signs
respectively. That is, conditional on participation, a household’s self-insurance expenditures exhibit
a significant U-shaped relationship with post- Cyclone Sidr income, initially declining, but then
increasing. This might imply that low- and high-income households allocate more for self-insurance
compared to middle-income households. Among the socio-economic variables, the coefficient
on age and years of education has a positive sign and is significant at the 5 percent level. These
38 Regarding the relationship between pre-Cyclone Sidr and post-Cyclone Sidr income, there is low correlation
either between the log of pre-income and log of post-income or between the square log of pre-income and
the square log of post-income.  These correlation results along with the t-tests confirm the difference
between the sources of income before and after the Cyclone Sidr event.  .
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outcomes suggest that if the head of the household is older and possesses a higher level of
education in terms of more education years, then the household invests more in self-insurance.
In addition, the results show that households also invest more in self-insurance if they have more
children. Households that come within the mangrove protected area and are located further
away from the mangroves invest less in self-insurance. These findings support the hypothesis that
close proximity to mangroves causes households to allocate less for self-insurance. That is, in
such cases, mangroves act as a substitute for self-insurance. Regarding the directional location
relative to the coast and the mangroves, households that are located in easterly and southwesterly
directions invest more in self-insurance. However, the results show that access to public disaster
relief and rehabilitation programs have no influence on household level self-insurance spending.
None of the storm characteristic variables is strongly significant.39
Furthermore, in order to fully test the research questions and conduct future sensitivity analysis,
we need to conduct further explorations on the functional forms and the econometric specifications
of the model. For future research, the study suggests looking at issues such as: (1) testing for the
correct choice of the functional form for the reduced-form demand equations of self-protection
and self-insurance expenditures. In this paper, we consider simple linear representations of the
reduced-form demand equations; (2) testing for seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) models.
A need for this can arise if the reduced form demand equations of self-protection and self-
insurance have the same dependent and independent variables where different coefficients are
linked together by some common, not measurable, factor. But there could be no efficiency gains
over OLS if the contemporaneous correlation across errors equals zero and there is less correlation
between explanatory variables across equations; and, (3) testing for simultaneity or endogeneity
bias. This could arise if there is interaction between the endogenous variables, self-protection
and self-insurance, within the system of their reduced form equations. For example, a possible
endogeneity issue can arise if the amount of ex-ante private protective spending that the households
incur in order to cope with expected storm-inflicted damages influences ex-ante public investment
in embankments.
7. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
This paper demonstrates an empirical application of a theoretical model in order to understand
how ex-ante private defensive strategies by coastal households evolve against ex-post storm-
inflicted damages given the level of government protective spending and the presence of a natural
storm protection barrier.
Results from the theoretical model show that a representative household’s marginal willingness to
pay for an increase in ex-ante public storm protection programs depends on two effects: (1) the
39 An interesting extension to the current work would be to test the inverted U-relationship of self-protection
and self-insurance expenditures with income by considering the corner solutions where households do
not invest in private protection, not because they choose to but rather because they cannot afford to.
This argument would be of interest to the relatively poor population.  Regarding marginal willingness to
pay, preliminary results from the case study reveals that it is possible to trace the marginal effects of public
programs and the mangrove forest on the households’ ex-ante private defensive behavior based on self-
protection and self-insurance.  However, the analysis requires the sign and the direction of the relationship
between public programs and the mangrove forest in order to obtain the ex-ante marginal willingness to
pay for public protective spending and for a possible natural storm protection barrier.  Further analysis
might establish this linkage to determine ex-ante marginal willingness to pay for the above programs
based on the available data.
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direct effect of the public programs on a household’s ex-ante self-protection spending; and
(2) the indirect effect of the programs on self-protection expenditures through a household’s
location relative to the coast and the mangrove forest. We obtain a similar result when we consider
the benefit to the household of an increase in its proximity to the mangrove forest. Both results
confirm the influence of public protection programs and the mangrove forest on private defensive
expenditures based on whether the public programs serve as a possible substitute or complement
to the storm protection provided by mangroves. In addition, the results further show that the
benefit to the household from an increase in ex-post public relief and rehabilitation programs
depends on the ratio of the marginal productivities of self-insurance and a household’s access to
these public programs. However, the comparative statics on how changes in public programs
and exposure to mangroves influence a household’s ex-ante private averting strategies with regard
to self-protection and self-insurance reveal that ex-ante public programs are complements to
self-protection expenditures but substitutes to self-insurance whereas ex-post public programs
are substitutes to self-protection but complements to self-insurance. Hence, ‘full’ or ‘partial’
crowding out effects might occur through a replacement of a household’s self-protection and
self-insurance activities given the presence of the mangrove forest.
To estimate the model empirically, the paper then focuses on a case study of the private defensive
expenditure allocation decisions of 500 households from 35 villages on the southwest coastal
areas of Bangladesh struck by a severe cyclone-induced storm surge event in November 2007.
Empirical results from the case study reveal the influence of public protective programs and the
mangroves on a household’s storm protection choices. However, results also show that the
location of the household vis--vis the mangrove barrier, other socio-economic, demographic,
and geo-physical factors seem to have a considerable influence and add a degree of complexity
to the relationship. Since the extent of the storm protection role of mangroves to protect lives and
property against large, infrequent, and long-period waves such as the tsunamis, hurricanes/
typhoons, tidal bores etc., is uncertain (Alongi, 2008; Wolanski, 2007; Cochard et al., 2008),
and it is possible that the government might not be able to continue its support for public programs
due to increased frequency in the occurrence of storms, the government should focus its programs
in areas that encourage more collective and individual participation in ex-ante private storm
protection against future storm-inflicted damages. In addition, the government should refrain
from undertaking costly programs such as the planting of mangroves around the vulnerable coastline
in inappropriate environmental settings, which might reduce long-term ecological sustainability in
the area (Feagin et al., 2009). Instead, it should promote sensible coastal development and
disaster preparation programs through individual and collective participation that enhance the
capacity of social-ecological systems to cope and adapt themselves against future storm-inflicted
damages. The government should also ensure that these programs are sustainable in the long run
taking into account the widespread poverty and limited insurance markets facing the Bangladesh
coastal communities.
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Table 3: Mean Comparison Tests of Two Groups Considering the Key Variables
Measures Group Type Obs. Mean Standard
Deviation
Post-Cyclone Sidr income Protected
Non-protected
Combined
212
277
489
59410.73
79044.27
70532.39
58453.12
84785.04
75085.42
Pre-Cyclone Sidr income Protected
Non-protected
Combined
200
249
449
266511.20
172609.40
214436.50
868803.70
209371.00
601446.40
Total damages Protected
Non-protected
Combined
218
275
493
91588.08
102013.60
97403.55
109468.20
170593.40
146695.10
Ex-ante
self-protection
expenditure
Protected
Non-protected
Combined
61
46
107
125909.80
52963.00
 94549.53
160780.80
115838.60
147123.70
Ex-ante
self-insurance expenditure
Protected
Non-protected
Combined
128
169
297
6446.09
28114.75
18776.07
12542.43
85224.33
65615.39
Table 4: Accessibility of Public Goods
Sl. No. Variable Name Protected Area (obs.) Non-protected Area (obs.)
1. House located inside embankment (%) 34.56 (217) 81.43 (280)
2. Cyclone shelter close to house (%) 44.19 (215) 61.73 (277)
3. Planning to migrate in future (%) 50.91 (220) 18.25 (274)
4. Reasons for future migration (%)
Unemployment
Floods
Cyclone & storm surge
Lack of opportunity
Poverty
41.96
37.50
73.21
73.21
39.29
36.54
65.38
59.62
59.62
30.77
5. Access to relief (%) 90.00 88.53
6. Access to rehabilitation (%) 64.68 46.35
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Table 5: Summary statistics of the Key variables
40 Regarding the direction of the mangrove forest from the household (union), there is no household that
falls into the northwest direction from the mangrove forest. Therefore, this category is dropped for
regression analysis under MDIR variable.
Sl.
No.
Variable Definition No. of
observations
Mean Standard
Deviation
1. L(DAMAGE) Log of the nominal value of Cyclone Sidr inflicted damages
(in Tk.)
493 10.885 1.1381
2. L(PREINC) Log of Pre-Cyclone Sidr HH Income (in Tk.) 449 11.569 1.079
3. L(PREINC2) Square log of Pre-Cyclone Sidr HH Income (in Tk.) 449 135.02 25.28
4. L(POSTINC) Log of Post-Cyclone Sidr HH Income (in Tk.) 489 10.648 1.262
5. L(POSTINC2) Square log of Post-Cyclone Sidr HH Income (in Tk.) 489 114.96 24.44
6. AREA Area of homestead, crop land, and the pond (in decimal) 500 142.6 24.441
7. EMB If household is protected by the embankment (=1, 0
otherwise)
497 0.6097 0.4883
8. DCOAST Distance from the coast (in Km.) 500 44.10 18.248
9. PROTECTED If household falls into the mangrove protected area (=1, 0
otherwise)
500 0.44 0.497
10. MDIST Distance between the union and the mangrove forest (in km.) 500 7.536 7.981
11. MDIR2-MDI-
R7
Dummy variable regarding the directional location of the
household relative to the coast and the mangrove forest
(MDIR2 = 1 if Southeast, 0 otherwise; MDIR3= 1 if East, 0
otherwise; MDIR4= 1 if Northeast, 0 otherwise; MDIR5 =
1 if North, 0 otherwise; MDIR6=1 if West, 0 otherwise; and
MDIR7=1 if Southwest, 0 otherwise.)
500 3.065 1.337
12. ARELIEF If household has access to relief (=1, 0 otherwise) 499 0.8938 0.3084
13. AREHABN If household has access to rehabilitation (=1, 0 otherwise) 492 0.5508 0.4979
14. SURGEHT Approximate average Cyclone Sidr induced Storm surge
height (in meter)
500 3.982 0.7085
15. STORMEXP If household falls into counter-clockwise direction from
Cyclone Sidr (=1, 0 otherwise)
500 0.42 0.4941
16. STORMDIS Directional Distance between Household and the Track for
the Cyclone Sidr (in km)
500 15.839 10.124
17. AGE Age of the respondent (in years) 497 42.221 13.252
18. EDUYR Average years of respondent education 492 6.868 3.643
19. CREDIT If household has access to credit (=1, 0 otherwise) 492 0.5752 0.4948
20. MEMBER If household is a member of village level organizations (=1, 0
otherwise)
486 0.1934 0.3954
21. MFRATIO Male/ Female ratio of the household 498 1.248 0.7933
22. CHILDREN Number of children in the household 500 1.26 1.1896
23. HELEV2-
HELEV3
Dummy variable regarding the elevation of the house
(HELEV1 =1 if high elevation, 0 otherwise; HELEV2 =1 if
medium elevation, 0 otherwise; and HELEV3 = 1 if low
elevation, 0 otherwise)
500 2.49 0.606
24. MIGRATION If planning to migrate in the future (=1, 0 otherwise) 494 0.328 0.469
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Table 6: Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) for Participation in Ex-ante Self-
Protection
Selection Equation (dependent variable is the probability of households participating in ex-ante self-protection)
Variable Parsimonious Model Add the
Public Programs
Add the Storm Surge
Characteristics
Add the Mangroves
and Socio-Economic
Characteristics
CONSTANT -16.393 -13.929 -14.985 -17.016
(-2.24)** (-1.75)** (-1.79)** (-2.09)**
L(DAMAGE) 0.1461 0.0401 0.2086 0.0541 0.229 0.0578 0.1904 0.0472
(2.20)** (2.83)*** (3.01)*** (2.49)***
L(PREINC) 2.255 0.6187 1.9174 0.4969 2.103 0.5311 1.568 0.3888
(1.83)** (1.44)* (1.50)* (1.15)
L(PREINC2) -0.0912 -0.0250 -0.0797 -0.0206 -0.0877 -0.0221 -0.0657 -0.0163
(-1.76)** (-1.41)* (-1.47)* (-1.13)
AREA 0.00057 0.0002 0.0007 0.0002 0.0007 0.0002 0.0007 0.0002
(2.20)** (2.46)*** (2.32)*** (2.23)**
EMB -0.1259 -0.0349 -0.3283 -0.0877 -0.3128 -0.0813 -0.2855 -0.0727
(-0.70) (-1.16) (-1.15) (-0.89) 
DCOAST 0.0037 0.001 -0.0069 -0.0018 -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0064 -0.0016
(0.81) (-0.52) (-0.07) (-0.37)
AGE -0.0055 -0.0014 -0.007 -0.0017 -0.0073 -0.0018
(-0.94) (-1.08) (-1.17)
EDUYR 0.0018 0.0005 0.0029 0.0008 0.0139 0.0034
(0.08) (0.14) (0.62)
CREDIT -0.3142 -0.0832 -0.3619 -0.0936 -0.3717 -0.0945
(-1.96)** (-2.18)** (-2.18)**
MEMBER 0.2792 0.0778 0.3039 0.0832 0.2117 0.0557
(1.30)* (1.39)* (0.96)
MFRATIO -0.0681 -0.0176 -0.1038 -0.0262 -0.1069 -0.0265
(-0.68) (-1.01) (-1.05)
CHILD -0.1586 -0.0411 -0.1820 -0.0459 -0.1804 -0.0448
(-2.18)** (-2.39)*** (-2.22)**
MIGRATION -0.1119 -0.0285 -0.1459 -0.0359 -0.1534 -0.0371
(-0.63) (-0.80) (-0.81)
PROTECTED 0.8032 0.2155 0.5199 0.1343 Dropped Dropped
(1.78)** (1.14)
MDIST -0.0229 -0.0059 -0.0159 -0.004 -0.032 -0.0078
(-0.82) (-0.56) (-1.11)
MDIR2 0.7931 0.2452 0.5497 0.1598 1.036 0.3242
(1.52)* (1.08) (1.83)**
MDIR4 0.5477 0.1655 0.3516 0.0989 4.023 0.9352
(0.84) (0.55) (2.86)***
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Outcome Equation (dependent variable is the level of household ex-ante self-protection expenses
         (in Tk.) conditional on participation in self-protection activities)
MDIR4 0.5477 0.1655 0.3516 0.0989 4.023 0.9352
(0.84) (0.55) (2.86)***
MDIR5 -0.2617 -0.0609 -0.0207 -0.0051 3.099 0.8589
(-0.45) (-0.04) (2.91)***
MDIR6 0.8058 0.2735 0.9882 0.3418 3.419 0.8355
(0.85) (0.99) (2.95)***
ARELEIF -0.4518 -0.1333 -0.4674 -0.1366
(-1.71)** (-1.72)**
AREHABN 0.2779 0.0693 0.2157 0.0529
(1.54)* (1.17)
SURGEHT 0.6539 0.1622
(2.16)**
STORMDIR 1.076 0.2909
(1.43)*
STORMDIS 0.0744 0.0185
(3.68)***
Variable Coeff. MarginalEffect
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
CONSTANT 2709939 4070751 3658025 4432671 
(1.56)* (2.40)*** (1.93)** (2.12)**
L(DAMAGE) 45167.46 48621.98 30142.76 37244.1 26922.96 38892.87 25545.6 39014.8
(3.36)*** (2.04)** (1.72)** (1.61)*
L(PREINC) -578470 -525166.6 -786305.4 -721048.5 -690174 -580241.5 -814284 -703382.8
(-2.09)** (-2.88)*** (-2.23)** (-2.43)***
L(PREINC2) 26382.03 24225.4 35749.09 33037.82 31430.78 26848.9 36618.4 31967.9
(2.26)** (3.08)*** (2.37)*** (2.55)***
DCOAST 972.81 1060.04 -109.46 -346.09 -442.38 -489.10 -109.71 -561.61
(1.51)* (-0.11) (-0.41) (-0.07)
AGE 134.02 -53.577 149.97 -196.18 10.961 -505.9
(0.15) (0.16) (0.01)
EDUYR -2209.98 -2148.82 -1536.4 -1380.44 -1955.19 -968.04
(-0.59) (-0.40) (-0.45)
CREDIT 28103.24 17455.38 41190.8 22358.03 52236.51 26064.6
(1.08) (1.47)* (1.68)**
MEMBER -49576.15 -40200.06 -62993.8 -47336.3 -68505.5 -53674.4
(-1.33)*  (-1.59)* (-1.68)**
MIGRATION -55314.81 -59134.22 -57172.6 -64825.51 -64695.7 -75591.3
(-1.96)** (-1.92)** (-2.03)**
PROTECTED 60345.25 87408.08 48111.6 75146.24 57203.8 57203.8
(1.09) (0.86) (0.64)
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Dependent variable is the probability of households participating in ex-ante self-protection activities. All
models are estimated using the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) of the sample selection method.
The LR stat to test independence between the error terms of the participation and outcome equations provide
little evidence against the null.  In addition, separate test shows higher collinearity between the inverse mills
ratio and the other explanatory variables. Hence, FIML and the two-part model (restricted likelihood) are
preferred over Heckman two-stage estimation for the sample selection model for ex-ante self-protection. Z-
tests are shown in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates. Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
MDIST 1246.03 466.74 1345.36 516.55 1584.7 -646.7
(0.45) (0.49) (0.50)
ARELEIF -57763.8 -80653.7 -50231.19 -82262.8
(-1.20) (-0.98)
AREHABN 18766.7 33319.3 23150.6 38429.9
(0.66) (0.76)
SURGEHT 2697.88 48953.4
(0.08)
STORMDIR 17013.9 91501.4
(0.22)
STORMDIS -1992.66 3270.7
(-0.78)
STORMDIS
RHO
LAMBDA
LOG
LIKELIHOOD
LR test  (p=0)
LR test  (prob.>X2)
OBS.
CENSORED
OBS
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Table 7: Two-part Model for Ex-ante Self-Protection
Variable Coeff. MarginalEffect
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
CONSTANT -16.825 -13.528 -14.696 -17.516
(-2.29)** (-1.70)** (-1.77)** (-2.11)**
L(DAMAGE) 0.1405 0.0387 0.2005 0.0519 0.2252 0.0568 0.19086 0.0472
(2.12)** (2.71)*** (2.93)*** (2.46)***
L(PREINC) 2.338 0.6446 1.899 0.4926 2.095 0.5288 1.7151 0.4238
(1.89)** (1.43)* (1.50)* (1.26)
L(PREINC2) -0.0946 -0.0261 -0.0791 -0.0205 -0.0874 -0.022 -0.07195 -0.0178
(-1.81)** (-1.41)* (-1.48)* (-1.24)
AREA 0.00055 0.0002 0.0007 0.0002 0.0006 0.0002 0.0006 0.0002
(2.07)** (2.20)** (2.06)** (1.96)**
EMB -0.1579 -0.0442 -0.4928 -0.1335 -0.5109 -0.1349 -0.5014 -0.1296
(-0.92) (-2.06)** (-2.06)** (-1.67)**
DCOAST 0.0038 0.001 -0.012 -0.0031 -0.0062 -0.0016 -0.0137 -0.0034
(0.83) (-0.91) (-0.45) (-0.77)
AGE -0.0043 -0.0011 -0.0049 -0.0012 -0.0053 -0.0013
(-0.74) (-0.80) (-0.86)
EDUYR 0.0045 0.0012 0.005 -0.0013 0.015 0.0037
(0.21) (0.23) (0.67)
CREDIT -0.3275 -0.0868 -0.3746 -0.0968 -0.3867 -0.098
(-2.03)** (-2.25)** (-2.26)**
MEMBER 0.2606 0.0723 0.2845 0.0774 0.2073 0.0543
(1.21) (1.29)* (0.93)
MFRATIO -0.0663 -0.0172 -0.1007 -0.0254 -0.1246 -0.0308
(-0.65) (-0.95) (-1.16)
CHILD -0.1495 -0.0388 -0.1752 -0.0442 -0.1835 -0.0453
(-2.00)** (-2.23)** (-2.26)**
MIGRATION -0.1217 -0.0309 -0.1364 -0.0337 -0.1139 -0.0276
(-0.69) (-0.76) (-0.61)
PROTECTED 0.9101 0.2449 0.6407 0.1661 Dropped Dropped
(1.96)** (1.35)*
MDIST -0.0121 -0.0031 -0.006 -0.0015 -0.0301 -0.0074
(-0.42) (-0.20) (-0.97)
Parsimonious Model Add the
Public Programs
Add the Storm Surge
Characteristics
Add the Mangroves
and Socio-Economic
Characteristics
Probit Equation (dependent variable is the probability of households participating in ex-ante self-protection)
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Variable Coeff. Marginal
Effect
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
CONSTANT 2901690 4100696 2863633 2936859
(1.90)** (2.48)*** (1.55)* (1.53)*
L(DAMAGE) 47736.82 47736.8 35520.91 35520.9 39516.18 39516.2 39146.87 39146.9
(3.95)*** (2.67)*** (2.86)*** (2.66)***
L(PREINC) -635757.1 -635757 -823434.8 -823434.8 -599123.5 -599123.5 -616253 -616253
(-2.47)*** (-3.00)***  (-1.92)** (-1.90)**
L(PREINC2) 29239.79 29239.8 37694.12 37694.1 27757.84 27757.8 28440.4 28440.4
(2.68)*** (3.24)*** (2.08)** (2.04)**
DCOAST 1390.51 1390.5 96.713 96.7 -48.022 -48.02 -124.37 -124.37
(2.34)*** (0.09) (-0.04) (-0.08)
Outcome Equation on the sub-sample (dependent variable is the level of household ex-ante self-protection
expenses (in Tk.) on the subsample of the population that participates in self-protection activities)
Parsimonious Model Add the
Public Programs
Add the Storm Surge
Characteristics
Add the Mangroves
and Socio-Economic
Characteristics
MDIR2 0.7902 0.2444 0.6015 0.1768 1.3347 0.4301
(1.55)* (1.15) (2.35)***
MDIR4 0.6174 0.1896 0.4317 0.1242 4.386 0.9457
(0.95) (0.64) (2.85)***
MDIR5 -0.3301 -0.0746 -0.1848 -0.0432 3.098 0.8591
(-0.55) (-0.31) (2.64)***
MDIR6 0.7477 0.2508 0.6105 0.1945 2.928 0.8158
(0.75) (0.59) (2.38)***
ARELEIF -0.4210 -0.1231 -0.4168 -0.1196
(-1.58)* (-1.52)*
AREHABN 0.2869 0.0714 0.2158 0.0528
(1.59)* (1.16)
SURGEHT 0.6388 0.1578
(1.94)**
STORMDIR 1.0011 0.2689
(1.18)
STORMDIS 0.0786 0.0194
(3.63)***
Log
Likelihood
Pseudo R2
LR Chi2 (df.)
OBS.
-214.37
0.0508
22.95 (6)
441
-184.40
0.1361
58.11 (23)
411
-176.153
0.1515
62.92 (25)
403
-169.374
0.1842
76.48 (27)
403
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Adjusted R2 0.3805 0.4235 0.4364 0.4145
F(n1,n2) 14.97 (4, 87) 6.81 (11, 76) 6 (13, 71) 4.72 (16, 68)
Log
Likelihood -1201.45 -1143.34 -1102.91 -1102.69
Prob. > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
OBS. 92 88 85 85
AGE 241.345 241.35 215.928 215.9 283.05 283.05
(0.25) (0.22) (0.28)
EDUYR -490.37 -490.4 665.94 665.9 1160.14 1160.14
(-0.13) (0.17) (0.28)
CREDIT 27680.48 27680.5 37688.56 37688.6 37420.94 37420.9
(1.02) (1.31)* (1.26)
MEMBER -44295.53 -44295.5 -48721.14 -48721.1 -52686.57 -52686.57
(-1.14) (-1.16) (-1.19)
MIGRATION -65733.72 -65733.7 -64489.91 -64489.9 -59913.91 -59913.91
(-2.17)** (-2.02)** (-1.78)**
PROTECTED 71645.87 71645.9 63388.46 63388.5 27847.18 37847.2
(1.21) (1.06) (0.30)
MDIST 789.59 789.6 1007.46 1007.5 475.23 475.23
(0.26) (0.33) (0.14)
ARELEIF -90189.7 -90189.7 -83969.91 -83969.9
(-1.82)** (-1.53)*
AREHABN 23944.33 23944.3 18170.76 18170.8
(0.78) (0.55)
SURGEHT 11015.67 11015.7
(0.32)
STORMDIR -33347.03 -33347.03
(-0.41)
STORMDIS 1149.46 1149.5
(0.58)
Under the two-part model, the first part is the Probit model and the dependent variable is the probability of
households participating in ex-ante self-protection activities. The second part is ordinary least squares (OLS)
on the sub-sample of the households who have positive investment in self-protection. For the Probit model,
Z-tests are shown in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates; whereas, t-tests are shown in parentheses
for OLS. Significance levels: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 8: Bivariate Probit Model for Participation in Ex-ante Self-Insurance
Variable
Parsimonious Model Add thePublic Programs
Add the Storm Surge
Characteristics
Add the Mangroves
and Socio-Economic
Characteristics
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
CONSTANT -20.950 -17.978 -17.064 -16.529
(-2.48)*** (-1.97)** (-2.14)** (-1.97)**
L(DAMAGE) 0.1780 0.0521 0.13715 0.0383 0.14136 0.0367 0.124 0.032
(2.65)*** (1.90)** (1.76)** (1.53)*
L(PREINC) 2.761 0.8085 2.316 0.6471 1.8164 0.4706 1.885 0.4872
(1.97)** (1.53)* (1.40)* (1.39)*
L(PREINC2) -0.125 -0.0365 -0.1085 -0.0303 -0.084 -0.0218 -0.0872 -0.0225
(-2.07)** (-1.66)** (-1.50)* (-1.49)*
L(POSTINC) 0.5063 0.5033 0.5086 0.1421 0.3918 0.1015 0.3904 0.1009
(1.05) (0.94) (0.73) (0.70)
L(POSTINC2) -0.0248 -0.0248 -0.0224 -0.0063 -0.0135 -0.0035 -0.0128 -0.0033
(-1.00) (-0.81) (-0.49) (-0.45)
AREA 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000
(1.04) (0.36) (0.89) (0.80)
EMB -0.0965 -0.0285 -0.1218 -0.0344 -0.2104 -0.0556 0.0389 0.01
(-0.58) (-0.52) (-0.83) (0.13)
DCOAST 0.0131 0.0038 0.0289 0.0081 0.0307 0.0079 0.0071 0.0018
(2.71)*** (2.04)** (2.07)** (0.37)
AGE 0.0026 0.0007 0.0017 0.0005 0.0027 0.0007
(0.45) (0.28) (0.44)
EDUYR -0.0215 -0.006 -0.0257 -0.0067 -0.0257 -0.0066
(-0.95) (-1.05) (-1.04)
CREDIT 0.3318 0.0907 0.2899 0.0737 0.2684 0.0682
(2.04)** (1.66)** (1.52)*
MEMBER -0.5969 -0.1424 -0.7511 -0.1567 -0.7626 -0.1581
(-2.54)*** (-3.01)*** (-3.03)***
MFRATIO -0.0256 -0.0071 -0.0039 -0.001 0.0064 0.0017
(-0.26) (-0.04) (0.06)
CHILD 0.1006 0.0281 0.1265 0.0328 0.1381 0.0357
(1.50)* (1.82)** (1.96)**
HELEV2 -0.5215 -0.1371 -0.6683 -0.1587 -0.7243 -0.1702
(-1.59)* (-1.84)** (-1.96)**
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For the Probit model, Z-tests are shown in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates. Significance levels:
***1%, **5%, *10%.
Log
Likelihood
Pseudo R2
LR Chi2 (df)
OBS.
-215.72 -186.63 -164.95 -163.13
0.0708 0.1457 0.2372 0.2456
32.86 (8) 63.65 (24) 102.59 (26) 106.22 (28)
426 397 389 389
HELEV3 -0.3243 -0.0922 -0.5244 -0.1404 -0.6227 -0.1671
(-1.00) (-1.46)* (-1.71)**
MIGRATION -0.0567 0.0157 -0.1055 -0.0269 0.0026 0.0007
(-0.31) (-0.53) (0.01)
PROTECTED -1.045 -0.2717 -1.394 -0.3313 Dropped Dropped
(-2.32)*** (-2.89)***
MDIST -0.0576 -0.0161 -0.0363 -0.0094 -0.0388 -0.01
(-1.93)** (-1.16) (-1.20)
MDIR2 0.7604 0.2465 0.820 0.2556 1.114 0.36
(1.13) (1.15) (1.49)*
MDIR3 0.5624 0.1851 0.831 0.2749 1.509 0.529
(0.77) (1.07) (1.36)*
MDIR4 0.5526 0.1767 0.7448 0.2341 2.244 0.732
(0.69) (0.88) (1.35)*
MDIR5 0.6410 0.2143 1.246 0.4337 1.159 0.400
(0.95) (1.73)** (0.91)
MDIR6 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
Variable Coeff. Marginal
Effect
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
MDIR7 0.6523 0.1882 1.183 0.3229 1.62 0.443
(0.92) (1.55)* (1.50)*
ARELEIF 1.038 0.1718 1.031 0.1705
(2.19)* (2.16)**
AREHABN 0.9787 0.2414 0.9839 0.2419
(5.27)*** (5.23)***
SURGEHT -0.3971 -0.1026
(-1.11)
STORMDIR 0.7691 0.2102
(0.90)
STORMDIS 0.0165 0.0042
(0.71)
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Table 9: Censored Tobit Model for Ex-ante Self-Insurance
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
CONSTANT 614800.6 687954.6 682264.6 788753.4
(2.52)** (2.82)*** (2.79)*** (3.12)***
L(DAMAGE) 10875.76 4794.28 11056.44 4903.52 10886.36 4889.99 10290.34 4619.81
(3.36)*** (3.37)*** (3.31)*** (3.13)***
L(PREINC) -23991.52 -10575.99 -41708.5 -18497.69 -43616.93 -19592.11 -43137.59 -19366.47
(-0.64) (-1.11) (-1.16) (-1.15)
L(PREINC2) 926.79 408.55 1685.32 747.44 1786.79 802.60 1763.46 791.69
(0.58) (1.06) (1.12) (1.11)
L(POSTINC) -142830.9 -62963.02 -148952 -66060.08 -146346.7 -65736.88 -150573.2 -67599.3
(-6.50)*** (-6.71)*** (-6.62)*** (-6.79)***
L(POSTINC2) 7997.30 3525.39 8208.83 3640.61 8069.31 3624.62 8303.51 3727.83
(7.07)*** (7.19)*** (7.09)*** (7.28)***
AREA 11.273 4.969 7.651 3.393 8.273 3.716 6.261 2.811
(0.79) (0.51) (0.55) (0.41)
EMB 11494.28 4979.53 11493.83 5009.38 12135.75 5357.6 21065.5 9177.09
(1.39)* (1.12) (1.17) (1.81)**
DCOAST 69.136 30.477 750.55 332.87 558.33 250.79 -281.77 -126.50
(0.31) (1.20) (0.88) (-0.35)
AGE 422.81 187.52 437.38 196.46 465.66 209.05
(1.63)* (1.66)** (1.77)**
EDUYR 1565.11 694.12 1626.18 730.46 1708.99 767.25
(1.55)* (1.62)* (1.69)**
CREDIT 6244.86 2749.67 7431.53 3311.94 7263.58 3235.77
(0.86) (1.01) (0.99)
MEMBER -6559.87 -2828.64 -6323.24 -2764.67 -7209.53 -3137.84
(-0.66) (-0.63) (-0.72)
MFRATIO 3953.25 1753.26 3342.89 1501.58 3361.53 1509.15
(0.89) (0.74) (0.75)
CHILD 14043.79 6228.41 14131.1 6347.49 14532.27 6524.21
(4.68)*** (4.66)*** (4.81)***
HELEV2 5002.21 2239.91 3217.64 1454.58 1300.92 585.56
(0.32) (0.21) (0.08)
Variable
Parsimonious Model Add thePublic Programs
Add the Storm Surge
Characteristics
Add the Mangroves
and Socio-Economic
Characteristics
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HELEV3 18353.86 7992.72 14278.06 6314.45 11206.3 4969.34
(1.20) (0.92) (0.72)
MIGRATION -437.1 -193.64 389.51 175.14 3679.06 1667.49
(-0.05) (0.05) (0.43)
PROTECTED -57083.2 -24168.77 -48700.64 -21102.47 -108113.3 -45438.73
(-2.78)*** (-2.33)*** (-1.64)**
MDIST -2193.51 -972.82 -2136.04 -959.48 -2353.73 -1056.7
(-1.62)** (-1.57)* (-1.70)**
MDIR2 7080.57 3236.67 10318.7 4847.12 25565.57 12788.6
(0.29) (0.42) (0.99)
MDIR3 15879.56 7737.35 16059.44 7924.94 59096.61 35903.96
(0.59) (0.59) (1.43)*
MDIR4 16318.43 7837.19 20901.45 10383.1 Dropped Dropped
(0.54) (0.68)
MDIR5 18229.54 8995.18 13942.58 6795.61 36779.67 20215.16
(0.71) (0.54) (0.73)
MDIR6 -10263.32 -4219.38 -2818.5 -1240.62 36227.26 20480.34
(-0.18) (-0.05) (0.58)
Variable Coeff. Marginal
Effect
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
Coeff. Marginal
Effect
MDIR7 20217.13 9161.74 20660.18 9468.01 56519.39 26812.41
(0.78) (0.79) (1.40)*
ARELIEF 15201.63 6225.6 13257.25 5489.84
(1.22) (1.06)
AREHABN -8048.1 -3633.6 -7985.78 -3603.5
(-1.02) (-1.01)
SURGEHT -8726.13 -3917.57
(-0.60)
STORMDIR -68176.39 -28015.26
(-1.48)*
STORMDIS 1193.24 535.7
(1.24)
For the Tobit model, t-tests are shown in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates. Significance levels:
***1%, **5%, *10%.
Log
Likelihood
Pseudo R2
Chi2 (df)
OBS.
-3433.021 -3207.32 -3178.62 -3176.60
0.0115 0.0196 0.02 0.0206
79.84 (8) 128.22 (25) 129.88 (27) 133.91 (29)
430 402 394 394
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Figure 3: Track of Cyclone Sidr and Its Satellite Image Making Landfall on the
South Western Coast of Bangladesh
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1
Table 1A: Sources of Data
Sl. No. Data Head Description Sources
1. Damages (losses) due to
Cyclone Sidr Property damages in selected villages
Disaster Management
Bureau (DMB); Household
Survey
2. Meteorological information Track of Cyclone Sidr; wind velocity at
different observation points; radius of
cyclone eye at selected observation points;
projected sea elevation (tidal surge) at
different coastal areas
Bangladesh Meteorological
Department (BMD);
Institute of Water Modeling
(IWM)
3. Geo-physical information Area of mangrove; location of
embankments; distances of the selected
unions (villages) from the coastline; from
Sundarban mangrove forest; from cyclone
shelters; from track of Cyclone Sidr.
Digitized maps from LGED,
CEGIS; Household Survey
4. Socio-economic information Total population; age; education years;
occupation; Cyclone Sidr pre- and post -
income level; asset information; male-female
ratio; children, etc.
Census data (Bangladesh
Bureau of Statistics, BBS);
Household Survey
5. Health-related information Symptoms/ types of disease due to Cyclone
Sidr; no. of days suffering; money spent for
health care
Household survey
6. Ex-ante averting activities Risk mitigating and risk coping information
based on participation (binary response)and
conditional on participation, expenses
incurred.
Household survey
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APPENDIX 2
Proof of PROPOSITION 1. Comparative analyses results show that we cannot determine the
direction of the relationship between a household’s averting behavior and ex-ante public protection
spending unless we impose additional restrictions.
Using the first order conditions (8) and (9), the implicit function theorem, and assuming that the
matrix H is the negative definite, the comparative static effects of a decrease in Gij on the optimal
levels of self-protection Zij and self-insurance Aij yields
In expression (A.2.1), the first term in the numerator on the right hand side is the direct effect of
the ex-ante public spending on self-insurance while the second term is the indirect effect.
In expression (A.2.2), the first term in the numerator on the right hand side is the direct effect of
the ex-ante public spending on self-protection while the second term is the indirect effect.
Expression (A.2.1) and (A.2.2) show that the sign and magnitude of the direct effect depends on
how a change in ex-ante public spending affects the expected marginal benefits of self-protection
    and the expected marginal benefits of self-insurance                      In addition, it depends
on the signs of HZZ  and HAA  which are both negative by the second-order conditions. Like the
direct effect, the indirect depends on the influence of ex-ante public spending on the expected
marginal benefits of self-protection and self-insurance. However, it also depends on the signs of
the cross partials of self-protection and self-insurance (HAZ = HZA) which cannot be determined.
Under it is the ‘no restriction’ condition, we can express the influence of ex-ante public protective
spending Gij on self-protection Zij as
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Similarly, we can state the influence of  Gij on ex-ante self-insurance Aij as
It is not possible to sign expression (A.2.3) and (A.2.4) unambiguously. We can only sign them
if the following conditions hold,
Condition 1. HAZ = HZA < 0. That is, assuming self-protection and self-insurance to be stochastic
substitutes. This implies that the marginal utility of ex-ante self-protection Zij decreases if more
ex-ante self-insurance Aij activities are taken by the household and vice-versa.
Condition 2.                      This suggests that more ex-ante government protection activities Gij
can accentuate the influence of self-protection Zij in reducing the l probability of facing storm-
inflicted damages to property.
Assuming conditions (1) and (2) are met, it is possible to sign - expressions (A.2.1) and (A.2.2)
accordingly.
Therefore, under additional restrictions, comparative statics result show that ex-ante government
protection spending Gij is a complement to ex-ante self-protection Zij but is a substitute to ex-
ante self- insurance Aij.
Proof of PROPOSITION 2. Starting with the risk-averse case, comparative results on the influence
of ex-post government risk-reducing programs like disaster relief and rehabilitation activities on
household averting behavior show that we can determine the direction of the relationship only
under certain restrictions. Comparative static results show
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Expressions (A.2.6)-(A.2.7) reveal that the sign and magnitude of the direct effects depend on
the own partials (Hzz and HAA)  as well as how a change in the ex-post public-assisted disaster
relief and rehabilitation programs influences expected marginal benefits of self-protection
               and self-insurance               Conversely, the indirect effects depend on the cross partials
(HAz and HZA)  and the influence of ex-post public-assisted disaster relief and rehabilitation
programs on the expected marginal benefit of self-protection and self-insurance.
Under the risk-averse assumption, results reveal that the direction of the relationship between
ex-ante public programs and the private averting strategies remain ambiguous because it is not
possible to determine the direction of influence of ex-post public programs Rij on the expected
marginal benefits of self-protection                           .  However, if we assume the households
to be risk neutral, then it is possible to establish the direction of the relationships by imposing the
additional restriction.
Under the ‘no restriction’ condition, the influence of ex-post government risk-reducing programs
Rij on household self-protection Zij show
Under the first term of the numerator, the bracketed portion representing                       cannot
be signed. Therefore, the sign of            remains ambiguous.
On ex-ante self-insurance Aij ,
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It is not possible to sign expression (A.2.9) unambiguously because we cannot determine the
directions of the influence of ex-post public assisted relief and rehabilitation program on the
expected marginal benefit of self-protection                              under the indirect effect. Moreover,
we need to impose an additional restriction to sign the term                  and the cross partial HzA.
Assuming household to be risk neutral, comparative static results show
Under the risk neutral case, it is possible to sign both (A.2.10) and (A.2.11) if the following
condition holds:
Condition 3.  A strict quasi-convex relationship exists between storm-inflicted property losses
and ex-ante self-insurance expenditures,.                            This means that property losses as
a result of a storm surge event decreases at a declining rate if the household is ready to commit
more self-insurance expenditure.
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Condition 4.   The probability of facing ex-post storm-inflicted property damages πij (.) is
strictly quasi-convex with respect to ex-ante self-protection expenditure
This implies that the probability of facing property losses as a result of a cyclone-induced storm
surge event falls at a decreasing rate with more increases in household self-protection expenditure.
Condition 5.                      Condition 5 states that more ex-post public-assisted disaster relief and
rehabilitation programs Rij accentuate the effect of self-insurance in reducing monetary loss or
damages to property as a result of a severe storm event. If Conditions (3)-(5) hold, then it is
possible to sign expression (A.2.10) and (A.2.11) indicating the following relationship
Expression (A.2.12) shows that ex-ante self-protection Zij is expected to go down but ex-ante
self-insurance Aij is expected to go up if households have more access to ex-post government-
assisted disaster relief and rehabilitation programs Rij. Consequently, one might observe a ‘crowding
out effect’on households’ self-protection but a ‘crowding in effect’ of self-insurance as a result of
an increase in Rij assuming the household to be risk neutral. It is not possible to come to a
conclusion if the household is risk averse.
Proof of PROPOSITION 3. Comparative analyses could examine the plausible impact of
mangrove forests as a natural storm protection barrier on household defensive behavior. The
initial comparative static results reveal that we require additional restrictions to establish any
relationship between the two variables.
Under the ‘no restriction’ condition, it is possible to express the influence of mangrove forests Mij
on self-protection Zij as
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Similarly, it is possible to state the influence of Mij on ex-ante self-insurance Aij as
As before, it is not possible to sign expression (A.2.13) and (A.2.14) unambiguously unless we
impose additional restrictions. It is possible to sign them using condition 6 (i.e.,HAZ = HZA < 0) as
well as by introducing the following restriction
Condition 6.                       This condition states that more storm protection from mangroves
Mij accentuates the influence of self-protection Zij in reducing the probability of facing damages
to property conditional on the storm event. Condition 6 suggests that the marginal probability of
facing damages to property conditional on the storm event as a result of self-protection
expenditures Zij decreases at an increasing rate for an increase in the household’s exposure to
the storm-protection services of mangrove forests Mij .
Assuming it is possible to meet conditions (1) and (6), expressions (A.2.13) and (A.2.14) show
With additional restrictions, the comparative statics result now demonstrates that exposure to
storm protection services of mangrove forests Mij is a substitute for households’ ex -ante self-
protection behavior (Zij).  However, it acts as a substitute for ex-ante self- insurance (Aij).
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APPENDIX 3
Combining equations (17)-(18), for ex-ante self-insurance, Aij, it is possible to express the two
‘hurdles’ (i.e., hurdles based on participation and outcome choices) for ex-ante self-insurance
Aij by the following econometric specification,
Expression (A.3.1) states that a separate set of factors as reflected under the vectors of explanatory
variables X1ij and  X2ij influence the household participation decision equation for self-insurance
(first hurdle) and the level of self-insurance expenditures equation conditional on participation
(second hurdle).
Similar econometric specification can be set for ex-ante self-protection expenditures, Zij .
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Expression (A.3.2) states that a separate set of factors as reflected under the vectors of explanatory
variables X3ij and X4ij influence the household participation decision equation for self-protection
(first hurdle) and the level of self-protection expenditures equation conditional on participation
(second hurdle).
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